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TENTH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE WTO: 
MAIN AGRICULTURAL OUTCOMES AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAS
GLOSSARY
DDA:  Doha Development Agenda 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES. The WTO does not have a specific definition of developed countries and developing 
countries that it applies in its work. Each Member State chooses its own classification, 
i.e., decides whether it is a developing country. It is worth noting that the WTO current-
ly has 162 Members, more than half of which are developing countries.
EU:  European Union
IDB:  Inter-American Development Bank 
ICTSD:  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
IICA:  Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 
INTAL:  Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean 
ITA:  Information Technology Agreement  
LAC:  Latin America and the Caribbean 
LDCs:  Least Developed Countries. The WTO recognizes as LDCs those countries that have 
been classified as such by the United Nations. They are the countries with lowest so-
cioeconomic indicators, especially according to the Human Development Index (HDI) 
(United Nations, 2007). Haiti is the only LAC country classified as an LDC. 
NFIDCs:  Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. Specific term included in the Marrakesh 
Decision, which gave rise to the WTO (1995) 
RLEDCs:  Relatively less economically developed countries
SDT:  Special and Differential Treatment 
SSM:  Special Safeguard Mechanism 
TTIP:  The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement 
between the U.S. and the European Union currently under negotiation 
WTO:  World Trade Organization. Sole international organization responsible for standards 




The Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) usually meets every two years and is the 
organization’s most important decision-making body. 
Through it, the representatives of the Member Countries, 
working within a multilateral framework, adopt decisions 
by consensus related to international trade.1 
Since the WTO came into existence on 1 January 1995, 
ten Ministerial Conferences have been held to enable the 
governments of the Member Countries to discuss glob-
al trade issues and the gradual liberalization of trade. 
Subjects such as agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, access to markets of goods, textiles, services, 
government procurement and intellectual property are 
addressed in specific WTO agreements. The main purpose 
of the Ministerial Conferences is to provide a multilateral 
forum for the establishment of a work plan in the field of 
global trade. 
It is very important that the WTO Member States un-
derstand and correctly apply the decisions taken at the 
Ministerial Conferences. In this regard, it is likely that 
the countries, especially the member countries of the 
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agricul-
ture (IICA),2 will need to build capacity if they are to 
comply fully with the decisions adopted at WTO Minis-
terial Conferences, particularly those taken at the most 
recent, the Tenth Ministerial Conference, held in Nai-
robi (hereinafter, the Nairobi Conference). With that in 
mind, IICA held a technical forum entitled “The Minis-
terial Conference in Nairobi: outcomes for IICA mem-
ber countries”3 to facilitate the information required by 
Member Countries to improve their agricultural poli-
cies and fulfill their multilateral commitments. 
The participation in the event of a group of specialists 
(Ulla Kask,4 Débora Cumes,5  Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla,6 
José María García7  and Timothy Josling8) enriched the 
activity and the preparation of this note9 is based on their 
technical contributions.  
The conference held in Nairobi, Kenya from 15-19 De-
cember 2015 was chaired by Amina Mohamed, Kenya’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It 
produced significant results in a number of areas of im-
portance for world trade, especially in the field of agri-
culture. 
IICA attaches special importance to the Nairobi Confer-
ence because of the partnership that exists between the 
WTO and IICA, and the meeting’s bearing on the Insti-
tute’s project Competitiveness and Sustainability of Agricul-
tural Chains for Food Security and Economic Development.10 
The agricultural outcomes of the Nairobi Conference 
are expected to lead to an overhaul of global agricul-
tural trade. The objectives of this technical document, 
targeted at the academic, business and governmental 
communities of IICA’s Member States, are therefore as 
follows: 
General objective:  
To analyze the agricultural outcomes of the Nairobi Con-
ference and their possible implications for the countries 
of the Americas.  
Specific objectives: 
- Analyze the agricultural outcomes of the Nairobi 
Conference. 
- Describe the agricultural outlook for the countries of 
the Americas in light of the outcomes of the Nairobi 
Conference. 
- Analyze the challenges faced by the countries of the 
Americas as they prepare for the next WTO Ministe-
rial Conference.11  
1. Refers to a situation in which several countries work together on a single aspect or issue.
2. All of IICA’s Member States belong to the WTO except The Bahamas, which has applied to join the organization.
3. The Technical Forum was held on 21 April 2016. More information is available at the following link: http://goo.gl/qZUti7  
4. Counsellor with the Agriculture Division of the WTO Secretariat.
5. Counsellor with Guatemala’s Permanent Mission to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
6. External researcher for the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). He has worked, as both a member of staff and a consultant, for various 
 international organizations, including IICA, FAO, the OAS and the World Bank.
7. Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Universidad Politécnica de Valencia (UPV); chair of the Group on International Economics and Development.
8. Member of the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, member of the American Association of Agricultural Economics since 2004, and 
 former chair of the Executive Committee of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
9. Prepared by IICA’s Adriana Faría Inciarte. 
10. Trade is addressed under component 1 of the flagship project on agricultural chains, entitled Policies and the Institutional Framework for the 
 Competitiveness of Agricultural Chains. One of the hemispheric-level deliverables of this component is the production of technical documents designed to 
 enhance the countries’ ability to manage policies and strengthen their institutional framework.
11. The WTO’s Eleventh Ministerial Conference is scheduled to take place in December 2017. 
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II. POST-BALI: THE AGRICULTURAL  
 SITUATION PRIOR TO THE 
 NAIROBI CONFERENCE
Nairobi was the first Ministerial Conference to be held 
in Africa since the WTO came into being. With the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) still under negotiation,12 the 
Nairobi Conference was viewed as an opportunity to ob-
tain the first concrete results since 2013, when the Ninth 
Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia.13    
The decisions adopted by the Member Countries in 2013, 
set out in the so-called “Bali Package,” include mandates 
related to trade facilitation;14 aspects of development, 
including food security in developing countries; matters 
concerning cotton and other provisions for the least de-
veloped countries (LDCs). The Bali Package also contains 
a political commitment by the countries to reduce export 
subsidies15 in agriculture and keep them at low levels, in 
addition to reducing technical barriers to trade when ag-
ricultural products are imported within the tariff quota 
framework16 (WTO, 2013). 
The commitments contained in the Bali Package are di-
vided into two groups: decisions related to the work of 
the WTO, and others directly related to the DDA, which 
includes the agricultural negotiations. Therefore, empha-
sis will be placed on the agricultural outcomes, which 
provided the basis for the negotiations at the Nairobi Con-
ference. 
The Bali Package contains decisions grouped together 
under the following specific agriculture-related head-
ings: 
1.  General Services programs:17 these incorporate 
land reform and rural livelihood security. They 
are particularly important “to enable a number 
of developing countries to achieve the objectives 
of rural development and poverty alleviation” 
(Ramírez, 2013). At the Ministerial Conference in 
Bali (hereinafter, the Bali Conference), a series of 
actions were agreed upon that fall within the green 
box,18 including land rehabilitation and resource 
management, rural employment programs, and 
drought management and flood control, among 
others. 
TENTH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE WTO: 
MAIN AGRICULTURAL OUTCOMES AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAS
12. Program launched by the ministers of the WTO Member Countries during the Ministerial Conference held in Doha, in November 2001. In general, it 
consists of a work program that reflects the commitment to assist developing countries. Its components include the dimension of development, technical 
assistance and capacity creation, market access, the application of standards, and dispute settlement. Its objective is to foster the liberalization of trade as a 
key factor in Member Country development. (McGuirk, 2002)
13. More information on the Bali Conference is to be found at http://goo.gl/aQddHJ
14. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (included in the Bali Package) contains provisions intended to facilitate the movement, release and clearance of goods, 
including goods in transit. It also contains measures to promote cooperation among customs authorities; and technical assistance and capacity building 
aimed at trade facilitation. (WTO, n.d.) 
15.  They are the most trade-distorting agricultural policy measures. The use of export subsidies reduces exporting countries’ income from agricultural exports, 
and hurts the domestic production of countries that import agricultural products (WTO, 2000). Such measures adversely affect both developed and deve-
loping countries.
16. The amber box includes domestic support measures to which caps apply. Since they are regarded as distorting production and trade, it is anticipated that 
the use of measures of this kind will be limited or reduced (WTO, n.d.).
17. A set of policies designed to provide services or advantages to agriculture or the rural community. Such programs may consist of training services, research, 
pest and disease control efforts, or marketing and promotion, among others.
18. According to the terminology employed by the WTO, subsidies are identified by “boxes” named after the colors of traffic lights. In the case of the agriculture 
sector, the measures included in the green box are “permitted” (WTO, n.d.).
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2.  Public stockholding for food security purposes: this 
is one of the most important outcomes of the Bali 
Conference. The Ministerial Decision establishes 
that “When governments buy food from farmers at 
supported prices to build up stocks, that counts as 
“Amber Box” domestic support,”19 (WTO, 2013). 
However, as the developing countries held to their 
position that it was very difficult to keep within 
the established limit, a working group was set up 
aimed at negotiating an agreement that would pro-
vide a definitive solution to the dispute.  
3.  Administration of tariff quotas:20 the countries 
have expressed concern at the possible mishan-
dling of the distribution of tariff quotas, which 
can create trade barriers. At the Bali Conference, 
the countries clarified how the terms contained 
in the agreement should be interpreted; and sur-
veillance and monitoring mechanisms were es-
tablished to prevent traders from using the quo-
tas assigned for their own benefit, and to avoid 
“underfill,” when part of a quota remains unused. 
(Ramírez, 2013). 
4. Export competition:21 this issue has always been high 
on the agenda of the multilateral negotiations on agri-
culture. Member Countries recognized the efforts being 
made to reduce policies that include subsidies and other 
advantages gained from export credit. Mechanisms were 
also put in place for information sharing and monitor-
ing and follow-up to promote the reform related to the 
efforts to eliminate all forms of export subsidies. (WTO, 
2013)
Thus, the Bali Package established an encouraging scenar-
io for the Nairobi Conference.  Despite the various criti-
cisms made of the multilateral trading system, the Mem-
ber Countries achieved good results following a successful 
round of negotiations. According to Alejandro Jara22 
(2013), the Bali Package could be viewed as a platform 
for resuming the negotiations in the areas that remain 
pending under the DDA, especially in the field of agricul-
ture. (ICTSD, 2013).
III. THE MAIN OUTCOMES OF THE 
NAIROBI CONFERENCE IN 
RELATION TO AGRICULTURE
The Nairobi Package contains six Ministerial Decisions: 
three related to agriculture, one on cotton23 and two 
concerning LDCs. In the case of the agriculture sector, 
the Nairobi Package includes commitments linked to 
export competition, the establishment of a special safe-
guard mechanism (SSM),24 and public stockholding for 
food security purposes. 
19. The amber box includes the internal assistance measures that are considered to be distortionary to production and trade, with a few exceptions. However, 
these measures can be applied, but are subject to the limits established under the Agriculture Agreement (WTO).
20. As provided for by the WTO, this is an instrument for controlling trade that limits the quantity of a given product that is imported or exported. Specifically, 
it involves the application of a lower tariff to a particular quantity of an imported good. A country may exceed the quantity that it imports but must pay a 
higher rate (Campos and Monge, 2014).
21. These are export subsidies and “parallel” measures that could provide loopholes for governments’ export subsidies and other related commitments. The 
WTO considers that “Price and quality are the only fair means of export competition and it is unfair to support exports through subsidised prices or subsi-
dised terms of payment.” (WTO, 2000)
22. Former Ambassador of Chile to the WTO; former Deputy-Director of the WTO; and Senior Counsel at King & Spalding LLP (Geneva, Switzerland). 
23. The WTO treats cotton as a specific issue but this note focuses on agrifood products. For more information about cotton in general, visit the following page 
of the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/cotton_e.htm.  For further information about cotton in the Nairobi Package, see the 
ICTSD report at the following link: http://goo.gl/YXa2UC. 
24. A special safeguard mechanism is an instrument that allows developing countries to raise tariffs (taxes on imported goods) temporarily in specific circum-
stances, e.g., when there is a sudden increase in imports or a drop in international prices. 
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A. Export competition
The Ministerial Decision on export competition includes 
commitments with regard to export subsidies and financ-
ing, and the operation of state trading enterprises and 
food security.  
• Export subsidies
The most important result of the Nairobi Conference 
was the elimination of agricultural export subsidies 
contained in Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(15)/45-
WT/L/980. This had been one of the demands of de-
veloping countries, including Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) nations, since the beginning of the 
Uruguay Round25  in 1986. Several Member Countries 
currently use export subsidies to support agricultur-
al exports. The legally binding decision is designed to 
eliminate such subsidies and thus prevent the distor-
tion of trade.26 
Specifically, the Nairobi Package “commits developed 
countries to end immediately all export subsidies,” while 
“developing countries would have to phase out their own 
use of export subsidies by the end of 2018.” (Hepburn, 
2016). This is to be accomplished taking into account two 
key points: 
1) Schedule for the elimination of subsidies: this es-
tablishes different dates that the Member Countries 
must observe. Most subsidies would be eliminated 
by the final date (2030). However, certain conditions 
and exceptions were established that must be taken 
into account, as well as specific guidelines for LDCs, 
developing countries, and net food-importing devel-
oping countries (NFIDCs).27 
2) Conditions linked to the elimination: in the case of 
developed countries, they apply only to processed 
products, dairy products, and swine meat.   
In addition, export subsidies must have been notified 
in one of the three most recent notifications examined 
by the Committee on Agriculture28 (before the date on 
which the Ministerial Decision was adopted). Further-
more, no export subsidies may be applied to new mar-
kets or new products. The Ministerial Decision also 
contains commitments regarding measures designed 
to ensure that other policies are not used as a hidden 
form of subsidy. Such policies include limitations on 
the benefits of financial support for agricultural ex-
porters, rules governing state enterprises involved in 
agricultural trade, and provisions designed to ensure 
that food aid does not negatively affect national pro-
duction. 
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25. The 1986 Uruguay Round was the first round of trade negotiations, in which 123 countries took part, prior to the creation of the WTO. The Uruguay Round 
led to a major overhaul of the global trading system and the adoption of the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements. 
26. Put simply, trade is distorted if “prices are higher or lower than normal and if quantities produced, bought and sold are also higher or lower than normal – 
i.e., than the levels that would usually exist in a competitive market” (WTO, n.d.)  For example, export subsidies can push up prices in a country’s internal 
market. The higher prices can encourage over-production, which fosters the sale of production surpluses on world markets where prices are lower. 
27. According to the Committee on Agriculture’s document G/AG/5/Rev.10, the LDCs recognized as net food-importing countries include the following IICA 
members: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, Dominican Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela (WTO, n.d.). Countries apply for inclusion in the list of NFIDCs  and must support 
their request with data and other required information. Even though these countries export agricultural products, it should be borne in mind that not all 
agricultural products are food.
28.  The WTO Committee on Agriculture handles agricultural matters. It oversees implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture and members can consult 
it about issues related to the fulfillment of their commitments. It reports to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods.
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• Financing of exports
The Ministerial Decision also defines the financing of 
exports, whether in the form of export credits, export 
credit guarantees or insurance programs.  The potential 
instruments mentioned include direct financing support, 
risk cover, government-to-government credit agree-
ments, or any other form of direct or indirect govern-
mental or public support. (Kask, 2016) 
The decision also established that, in the case of de-
veloped countries, the maximum repayment term for 
credits should be no more than 18 months. However, 
the terms of what is known as special and differential 
treatment29 (SDT) were amended. The decision of the 
Member Countries establishes that SDT is only intended 
to provide a longer timeframe for fulfilling commitments 
and that the final point that must be reached is the same 
for all member countries. 
• State trading enterprises
With respect to state trading enterprises, members 
“shall ensure that agricultural exporting state trading 
enterprises do not operate in a manner that circum-
vents any other disciplines contained in this Decision” 
(ICTSD, 2015). Enterprises that effectively subsidize 
exports will not be allowed to do so once the terms 
have expired. In the text of the Ministerial Decision, 
Member Countries are also asked to make every effort 
to prevent any monopoly power30 exercised by such 
enterprises from distorting trade. 
• Food aid 
The WTO is not an organization that provides food aid 
but its work is carried out through the establishment of 
disciplines.  As a result, the Member Countries agreed to 
establish general and specific commitments. The gener-
al commitments include measures to ensure that the de-
livery of available food aid in emergencies is not imped-
ed unintentionally. Specific commitments, on the other 
hand, include measures designed to ensure that a real 
need exists in the recipient country; and that donor Mem-
ber Countries do not use international food aid to offload 
their surpluses. Under this scheme, food aid should not 
be re-exported and or be linked to commercial or prof-
it-making objectives. (Kask, 2016)
Another specific commitment concerns the monetiza-
tion of food. Monetization is not prohibited outright. 
Monetizing food aid means that “donor countries sell 
in-kind food in recipient countries to raise funds for 
use in development projects.” (ICTSD, 2015) The dis-
ciplines related to monetization establish certain con-
ditions, for example, that the monetization of aid can 
be used if it is necessary for the purpose of transport 
and delivery of food assistance, or to redress food defi-
cit requirements or insufficient agricultural production, 
among others. 
It is the first time that commitments related to the mon-
etization of food aid have been included.  Part of the 
Ministerial Decision also establishes that donor coun-
tries should undertake a prior analysis of the local mar-
ket of the beneficiary country, and employ commercial 
entities to monetize the assistance. Furthermore, for the 
first time recipient countries may decline the assistance. 
(Kask, 2016)
29. The WTO agreements contain special provisions under which developed countries can treat developing countries more favorably than other WTO mem-
bers. These special provisions include longer time periods for fulfilling commitments, measures to increase trading opportunities for developing countries, 
and assistance for WTO developing country members, among others. (WTO, n.d.)
30. In economics, a monopoly occurs when a single enterprise supplies a good or service. The difference in a competitive market is that the enterprise in ques-
tion has total control over the price of the good or service (Triunfo, n.d.).
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B. The special safeguard mechanism (SSM)
The Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(15)/43-WT/L/978 
establishes that “the developing country Members will 
have the right to have recourse to a special safeguard 
mechanism (SSM) as envisaged under paragraph 7 of 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.”31 (ICTSD, 
2015) That paragraph establishes that developing coun-
try members have the right to raise tariffs temporarily 
in the event of a sudden surge in import volumes or a 
price depression. 
The Member Countries also agreed to pursue negotiations 
on an SSM for the developing countries under the aegis 
of the Committee on Agriculture. That committee holds 
work sessions with the Member States to discuss specific 
subjects, including the SSM.
However, countries that export agricultural products 
expressed disagreement with the SSM. They insisted 
that a special safeguard mechanism should only be 
negotiated in the context of a broader deal on market 
access. This is because they fear that higher tariffs will 
be used to restrict access to the present markets of 
countries that export agricultural products. (Hepburn, 
2016)
 
C. Public stockholding for food security purposes
Some developing countries use public stockhold-
ing programs to purchase food at administered pric-
es and distribute them among the poorest members 
of the population.  However, while food security is 
a legitimate policy objective, stockholding programs 
are considered to distort trade “when they involve 
purchases from farmers at prices fixed by the govern-
ments, known as “supported” or “administered” pric-
es.” (WTO, 2015)
At the Bali Conference, the Member Countries reaf-
firmed their commitment to continue the efforts to find 
a permanent solution to this problem.  However, the 
Ministerial Decision of Nairobi does not contain any-
thing particularly new compared with what was nego-
tiated in Bali. 
Since the Bali Conference, the Member Countries 
have submitted proposals aimed at finding a perma-
nent solution. One idea was proposed by the G-33, 
which suggested, “transferring the support provided 
under such programs to the green box (which in-
cludes domestic support for agriculture that is permit-
ted and not subject to limits because it does not have 
distortive effects on trade).” (WTO, 2015)  However, 
other Member Countries disagree and believe that the 
use of administered prices can have unforeseen conse-
quences for international trade and the food security 
of other members. 
As a result, Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(15)/44-
WT/L/979 includes a commitment for the Member 
Countries to continue their efforts to find a permanent 
solution to this issue, with consideration to be given to 
a final proposal at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference 
in 2017. It also reaffirms the obligation to continue the 
negotiations in special sessions of the Agriculture Com-
mittee and in dedicated sessions not linked to other is-
sues such as domestic support.33 
TENTH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE WTO: 
MAIN AGRICULTURAL OUTCOMES AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAS
31. The Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO was held in Hong Kong, China, from 13-18 December 2005.
32. Also known as the “Friends of Special Products” in agriculture. It is a group of developing countries pressing for flexibility for developing countries to un-
dertake limited market opening in agriculture (WTO, n.d.).
33. Support provided by national governments to the agriculture sector. There are two categories of domestic support: support that does not distort trade or has 
a minimum impact (green box); and support that distorts trade (amber box) (WTO, n.d.).
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Therefore, it was agreed that these negotiations remain 
outside of the negotiations on agriculture under the 
DDA. The Member Countries are divided on this point 
because some States favor separate negotiating tracks for 
certain issues, while others deem it more advisable not 
to decouple negotiating topics like market access. (Kask, 
2016)
Finally, it is important to point out that the WTO Com-
mittee on Agriculture is the body responsible for moni-
toring and ensuring that Member Countries fulfill their 
commitments with regard to export competition. It also 
ensures the continuation of the negotiations in specific 
debates (dedicated session on export competition), con-
ducts the annual appraisal of the provisions on inter-
national food aid and, once every three years, studies 
the disciplines related to the commitments assumed in 
Nairobi.
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
 THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
 AMERICAS
The most significant outcome of the Nairobi Conference 
was, without a doubt, the agreement reached on ex-
port competition. Following years of negotiation, Mem-
ber Country ministers agreed to reduce export subsidies 
gradually by a specific date.  However, the matter of most 
concern is the economic importance of Nairobi for the ag-
ricultural sector. 
 
Considering the heterogeneous characteristics of 
countries in the region, it is possible to envision sce-
narios based on the decisions taken in Nairobi. The 
matters addressed in the Nairobi Package, and the pos-
sible implications for the countries of the Americas, 
are therefore discussed below. The areas concerned 
are export competition, the special agricultural safe-




The section of the Nairobi Package dealing specifically 
with export subsidies is one of the most important for 
LAC, since the region is the world’s biggest agricultural 
exporter. The elimination of export subsidies was a prior-
ity for countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. The 
adoption of this measure makes it possible to “achieve a 
level playing field for agricultural trade, so that highly 
competitive companies and countries can participate in 
trade successfully.” (González, 2016). 
However, an analysis carried out by the Institute for the 
Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), 
of the Integration and Trade Division of the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank (IDB), found that the actual ef-
fects of the measures related to the elimination of sub-
sidies would not be felt in the short term. Specifically, 
because “the type of subsidies that were banned (direct 
budgetary outlays to producers on the condition that the 
product crosses the country’s borders) have already been 
reduced over the last 15 years” (Mango, 2016). 
However, these measures were not sufficient to reduce 
competition in global agricultural markets. This is because 
various subsidy-related practices, such as credit guaran-
tees, were not banned but simply regulated.  Further-
more, it is estimated that domestic support in developed 
countries grew or remained constant. Evidence of this is 
to be found in an exception contained in a footnote in the 
Nairobi Package allowing developed countries to contin-
ue to make payments for dairy products, swine meat, and 
processed products until 2020 (Hepburn, 2016).  Howev-
er, the developed economies governed by the clause made 
a commitment not to increase the amount of products 
that will benefit from the measure or to subsidize exports 
destined for LDCs. 
The position of developed countries like the U.S. and the 
members of the European Union (EU)  was positive for 
achieving consensus on the elimination of export subsidies. 
It is a gain for the U.S., as it was one of the leaders of the 
G-2034 that wished to eliminate them. (Josling, 2016). Nor 
is the issue of export subsidies is very important for the Eu-
ropean Union, considering that it has not applied them since 
the 1980s.
Moreover, in the event of a fall in agricultural commodity 
prices (which is feasible in the years ahead), the possibility 
of granting export subsidies will be reduced.  This would 
benefit the developing countries, because they would not 
be in a position to subsidize their agricultural exports if the 
prices of agricultural goods fell. (Díaz-Bonilla, 2016)
34. Coalition of developing countries pressing for ambitious reforms in agriculture in the developed countries, with flexibility for developing countries (WTO, 
n.d.). This group is different from the G-20, made up of ministers of finance and governors of central banks.
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In short, the decision concerning the elimination of 
export subsidies does not significantly affect the cur-
rent situation of global agricultural trade. This is be-
cause the vast majority of developed countries were in 
the process of eliminating export subsidies even before 
the Nairobi Conference. However, as subsidy practic-
es like export credit were not eliminated, but merely 
regulated, the negotiations should continue to prevent 
practices of this kind from becoming trade-distorting 
measures.  
• Export credits
The discussion regarding export guarantees and cred-
its should continue. The LAC countries currently re-
ceive roughly 50% of the credits but most are not ex-
periencing budget or balance of payments35 problems 
that make them necessary. However, in the event of 
an economic downturn36 such credits could promote 
markets that were restricted. (Díaz-Bonilla, 2016). 
Consequently, Member Countries should continue the 
negotiations on this issue with a view to fostering prac-
tices that do not distort trade. 
• State trading enterprises
The importance of the issue of state enterprises varies: for 
some developed countries, such as the U.S., it is not a big 
problem; and Canada is currently working to eliminate the 
limitations that exist in the country. (Josling, 2016)
On the other hand, the issue is an important one for de-
veloping countries. The LAC countries should participate 
in the negotiations, as most state enterprises are to be 
found in developing countries (Díaz-Bonilla, 2016).  It is 
also important to ensure transparency, monitor the infor-
mation-sharing efforts of such enterprises, and improve 
the WTO notification process. In addition, the countries 
should bear in mind that state trading enterprises in-
volved in importing are responsible for most trade distor-
tion, not those engaged in exporting. 
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35. A country’s balance of payments “is an accounting document that records all economic transactions between the residents of the country and the rest of the 
world” (Pérez, 2010).  Put simply, a positive balance of payments is when exports exceed imports, while a negative balance of payments is when imports 
are greater than exports. 
36. Decrease in economic activity over a period of time. In this case, Díaz-Bonilla is referring to the possible fall in agricultural prices. 
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• International food aid
In the case of international food aid, conceptual limita-
tions exist that make it difficult to identify the recipient 
countries that actually need assistance.
 
At the present tie, there are other conceptual categories 
besides developed members, developing members and/
or LDCs. The relatively less developed countries or rel-
atively less economically developed countries (RLEDCs) 
are a case in point. In general, RLEDCs «display two basic 
characteristics: less development and a smaller domestic 
market than the other countries involved in the same 
integration mechanism.” (FLACSO, n.d.)  However, it 
should be noted that there is no single criterion or set of 
standardized indices accepted by the international com-
munity for determining a country’s relative development. 
Instead, studies are carried out using a variety of criteria 
and indices. 
A study conducted by Díaz-Bonilla using the cluster anal-
ysis37 technique makes reference to RLEDCs. According 
to the findings, if food security is the main international 
concern, the LAC countries fall into the food insecurity 
category. This conclusion was reached based on 10 dif-
ferent categories of food insecurity and conducting vari-
ous analyses to identify countries from the most secure to 
the most insecure. The results suggest that most insecure 
countries are those that are relatively less developed but 
some States that are not also fall into the category of in-
secure countries. 
Thus, although the Nairobi Package establishes general 
and specific commitments on the issue of international 
food aid, the negotiations should continue to ensure that 
the heterogeneity of the Member Countries does not re-
sult in food aid being used inappropriately. 
B. Special safeguard mechanism
It is understood that developing countries will have the 
right to apply the special safeguard mechanism to afford 
low-income farmers a degree of protection against the 
volatility of international agricultural markets. This was 
one of the key demands of the G-33 countries, as “small 
farmers, the backbone of the agricultural systems of the 
developing countries, do not have effective safeguards 
against volatile price movements in agricultural commod-
ities.” (Dhar, 2016). 
As a result, developing countries maintain their right to 
apply the SSM, provided they meet the specific require-
ments of collecting objective scientific information to sup-
port its use. This is necessary to prevent measures being 
imposed that unjustifiably undermine and hinder free 
trade among the Member Countries.
The right to apply the SSM is an extension of the use 
of the safeguards clause of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)38 to agriculture. However, the 
use of the SSM is limited and available to a small group 
of developing countries39 that converted the nontariff 
barriers40 imposed on specific products in the pre-WTO 
phase into tariffs, a process known as “tariffication.” For 
that reason, countries that do not enjoy that right ar-
gued that the mechanism should be broader in scope 
than at present, especially in terms of the products cov-
ered. (Dhar, 2016)
However, developed countries like the U.S. have repeat-
edly stated their disagreement with measures of this kind, 
viewing them as a way for developing countries to raise 
tariffs above WTO-permitted levels. Josling (2016) re-
ferred to this as a defeat for the U.S. during the negoti-
ations. 
C. Public stockholding
The developed and developing countries also have dif-
fering opinions on the question of public stockhold-
ing. Nations like the U.S. disagree with such measures, 
claiming they are used to increase support for farmers 
and the agricultural sector in general. Furthermore, de-
veloping countries have argued that the way in which 
farm subsidies are currently calculated at the WTO “fails 
to take into account the impact of price inflation that 
has occurred since reference prices were established in 
the multilateral agency over two decades ago.” (Hep-
burn, 2016)
The fact that the Member Countries reaffirmed their inten-
tion to continue the negotiations shows that their positions 
have not changed significantly since the Bali Conference. 
As far as public stockholding is concerned, the Agreement 
37. Cluster analysis is a technique used to group elements or variables together, endeavoring to achieve the maximum homogeneity of each group and, at the 
same time, the biggest possible differences between groups (Terrádez, n.d.).
38. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the agreement drawn up during the Havana Conference in 1947, signed by 23 countries, aimed 
at establishing a set of trade guidelines and tariff concessions. The GATT was the precursor to the WTO. 
39. Only 39 WTO Member Countries have the right to use the SSM. Twenty-three of them are developing countries (Dhar, 2016). 
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on Agriculture is applied exclusively to programs under way 
since the adoption of the Ministerial Decision of Bali on 7 
December 2013. Programs must be consistent with the cri-
teria included in the agreement and the introduction of new 
public stockholding programs is not ruled out. (Glauber, 
2016)
Finally, the decision on this subject is now a Ministe-
rial Decision. There is a non-temporary interim peace 
clause,41 which means that final agreement on the mat-
ter is expected in the next round of negotiations. 
V. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS IN 
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WTO 
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
The Nairobi Conference allowed the governments of the 
WTO Member Countries to reach agreement on a series 
of issues that are important for agriculture. However, 
other important matters related to international agricul-
tural trade have yet to be resolved. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to identify a series of challenges for the countries 
based on the implementation of the Nairobi Package and 
in the run up to the next WTO Ministerial Conference 
in 2017:  
1.  One of the main challenges faced by developing 
countries is greater recognition by other WTO 
Member Countries. For example, Guatemala, 
the coordinator of the Group of Small, Vulner-
able Economies,  is seeking greater recognition 
of SDT, and differentiation between large and 
small developing countries.  It is argued that 
such differentiation is necessary because devel-
oping countries cannot compete on equal terms 
and conditions due to differences in size. (Cu-
mes, 2016). 
2.  For many countries, especially the LAC econo-
mies, the political and economic cost of participat-
ing in the Nairobi Conference was considerable. 
According to Cumes (2016), the delegations of 
some countries that took part in the negotiations 
were small because of the high costs involved, ad-
versely affecting the parallel negotiations (and not 
only in agriculture). This is a major challenge for 
small countries that are unable to participate in 
the multilateral sessions as they lack sufficient fi-
nancial resources and human capital. 
3.  The absence of consensus among the Member 
Countries with regard to the conceptualization 
of domestic support. This is one of the issues on 
the negotiating agenda that remains unresolved 
and is very important for the crafting of policies. 
For example, in the U.S., the new farm bill es-
tablished measures to convert direct payments to 
farmers into other types of domestic support in-
cluded in the amber box. In contrast, the EU’s re-
formed agricultural policy, hailed as “the green-
ing of European agricultural policy,” calls for the 
elimination of export subsidies, but includes di-
rect payments for farmers. Specifically, the direct 
payments are: 
 decoupled payments that do not have trade-dis-
torting effects but could lead farmers to decide 
to continue production; without such payments, 
production could disappear and thus have a dis-
torting effect. (García, 2016)
 Therefore, domestic support continues to be one 
of the issues pending for negotiation under the 
DDA. It is believed that the internal pressures ex-
erted by ecological groups, environmentalists, and 
organized civil society will ultimately be what de-
termine the modification of agricultural policies 
and result in the Doha agenda being concluded 
with concrete results.
4.  Improving the conditions of market access is im-
portant for the LAC countries, as the belief that 
the application of subsidies or domestic supports 
will expand production and trade is erroneous. 
Practices of this kind actually “generate a great 
deal of protection and only give limited access, 
which is not advisable because it creates distor-
tion.” (Díaz-Bonilla, 2016)
5.  Further declines in agricultural prices would be 
a challenge for WTO Member Countries because 
under the previous arrangement they could grant 
around USD 11 billion in export subsidies when 
prices were low, displacing about the same val-
ue of agricultural exports from countries that do 
not apply subsidies, most of which are developing 
nations. In the new scenario, “the possibilities of 
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valuation of goods at customs, among others. 
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subsidies are reduced but not eliminated, thanks 
to the transition period imposed as part of the 
terms of the WTO.” (Díaz-Bonilla, 2016)
6.  The effect of macroeconomic policies (including 
monetary policies) should not be overlooked, as 
they can affect trade more than trade policies. 
(Díaz-Bonilla and García, 2016). In addition to 
the political and economic aspects, macroeconom-
ic measures like exchange rates have a big impact 
on exports; as a result, they should be reviewed 
and monitored by the countries. In particular, the 
international community needs an opportunity to 
analyze the question of exchange rates. (Díaz-Bo-
nilla, 2016)
7.  The proliferation of negotiations and the signing 
of regional trade agreements also look set to pose 
a major challenge for Member Countries. There 
are two aspects to this point: firstly, countries use 
regional trade agreements to establish more open 
trade relations, fostering the elimination of tar-
iffs on given products and promoting commercial, 
cultural, and political exchange. A case in point is 
the U.S. position regarding the expansion of the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) in the 
negotiations that took place parallel to the Nairobi 
discussions. The ITA serves as a multilateral plat-
form for implementing regional trade agreements 
on trade in e-products, an aspect that is of the ut-
most importance for countries like the U.S. (Jos-
ling, 2016)
 However, the proliferation of regional trade agree-
ments could end up undermining the pillars of the 
multilateral trading system, because agreements 
of that kind tend to favor the interests of region-
al forces or the most powerful countries. (García, 
2016). Without a level playing field, the negoti-
ating strength of each region and each country 
would prevail and set the pace of the negotiations 
on market access. An issue as important as market 
access would be decided more by negotiating ca-
pacity than a multilateral consensus and a stable 
institutional framework, characteristics offered by 
the WTO. The process of negotiating the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is 
an example of what is likely to occur. 
8.  The Member Countries face the challenge of in-
cluding issues that were not covered in Nairobi in 
the next WTO Ministerial Conference. They must 
also endeavor to define a post-Nairobi work pro-
gram that includes all the sensitive areas and in-
terests of the Member Countries, key elements for 
the next round of negotiations. Lastly, they need 
to establish a structure that everyone agrees upon, 
as some countries favor the incorporation of new 
issues, while others are opposed to the idea. 
 At the end of the day, the challenges facing the 
countries are to keep the multilateral trading sys-
tem alive, evaluate the results achieved, and es-
tablish specific work programs with a view to 
resolving outstanding issues. A transparent pro-
cess inclusive of all Member States is required, to 
strengthen the work of the WTO as the entity re-
sponsible for regulating world trade.
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